Rights, Operating Systems and ⿻ Freedom
4-0-权利-操作系统-和-自由
Each day, Luna navigates a labyrinth of tech,
From towering giants to startups, a trek.
Interviews blend into a monotonous dance,
Jargon-filled words, devoid of values' stance.
She yearns for projects of substance and worth,
But opportunities veer from her dreams' birth.
每天，露娜都在科技的迷宫中穿行，从科技巨头到初创公司，步履不停。面试变成了单调乏味的舞蹈，充斥着专业术语，却缺乏价值导向。她渴望从事有意义有价值的项目，但机会却与她的梦想背道而驰。
One night, deflated, she sinks into her couch,
Holographic ads engulf her, a sensory slouch.
"Nourishing democracy's river," the narration begins,
Capturing her gaze as the manifesto spins.
Fatigue fades as her mind starts to churn,
Screen in hand, words illuminating her concern.
一天晚上，她泄气地瘫坐在沙发上，全息广告将她包围，让她身心俱疲。“滋养民主的河流”，旁白开始解说，吸引了她的目光，宣言徐徐展开。疲惫消退，她的思绪开始活跃，她手持屏幕，文字照亮了她心中的担忧。
"To those crafting digital communication's frame,
Ensuring privacy, free speech, and equality's flame."
She imagines a hackathon, debates fierce yet fair,
Creating controversial yet impactful software.
“致那些构建数字沟通框架的人们，守护隐私、言论自由和平等的火焰。”她想象着一个黑客马拉松，激烈的辩论却公平公正，创造出具有争议性却又影响深远的软件。
"To innovators mirroring our best relations,
Where clicks and interactions build shared celebrations."
She dreams of heartfelt thanks from children she's aided,
Buying soda with gratitude, community ties unfrayed.
“致那些以我们最佳关系为镜子的创新者们，让点击和互动构建共同的庆祝。”她梦想着收到她所帮助的孩子们的衷心感谢，用感激之情购买苏打水，社区联系紧密而持久。
"To pioneers of digital assets, a toast,
Empowering choice, economic equality's coast."
She envisions harnessing her phone's might,
Buying magical potions, adventuring through the night.
“致数字资产的先驱者们，敬一杯酒，赋予选择权，通向经济平等的海岸。”她设想着利用手机的力量，购买神奇药水，在夜间冒险。
"To creators of digital democracy, a cheer,
Where governance is a journey, transparent and clear."
She pictures modernizing her family's ancient vines,
Adopting UN techniques, progress intertwines.
“致数字民主的创造者们，欢呼吧，治理是一段旅程，透明而清晰。”她想象着让家里的古老葡萄藤焕发新生，采用联合国的技术，进步与发展交织在一起。
"To moral compasses, navigating the virtual sea,
Ensuring digital realms reflect our highest decree."
Luna realizes her calling transcends mere platforms,
Building societal pillars, enriching human norms.
“致那些在虚拟海洋中导航的道德指南针，确保数字领域反映我们最高的准则。”露娜意识到她的使命超越了简单的平台，她正在构建社会支柱，丰富人类规范。
"Together, this community isn't just coding software,
We're sculpting a legacy of compassion and welfare."
In each digital interaction, a chance to uplift,
Connecting humanity, mending the rifts.
“团结起来，这个社区不仅仅是编写软件，我们正在塑造一个充满同情和福祉的遗产。”每一次数字互动都是一次提升的机会，连接人类，弥合分歧。
Internet founder JCR Licklider (Lick) saw a far wider range of fundamental protocols as foundational to a network society than have thus far been manifest in internet protocols. Yet his analysis was more a laundry list than a philosophical analysis. To articulate a clear vision of the foundations of a ⿻ society, in this chapter we draw on the definitional concepts of ⿻ to outline what these protocols should consist of and the role they should play socially. Then, in the rest of this part of the book, we systematically explore these, the limits to their implementation today and how they might be more fully achieved.
互联网创始人JCR利克莱德（利克）认为，构成网络社会的基础协议，远比互联网协议中已有的范围更广。然而，他的分析更像是一个清单，而不是哲学分析。为了阐明⿻社会的基石的清晰愿景，本章将利用⿻的定义性概念来概述这些协议应该包括什么以及它们在社会中应该扮演什么角色。然后，在本书的其余部分，我们将系统地探讨这些协议，它们在今天的实施限制以及如何更充分地实现它们。
We argue that ⿻ societies must be founded on infrastructure that matches the principles of ⿻ in both form and structure. Formally, they must combine seamlessly the closely related political idea of a system of rights and technological concept of an operating system. Substantively they must allow the digital representation of societies in the terms ⿻ understands them: as diverse, intersecting social groups and people that jointly undertake ambitious and inclusive collaborations.
我们认为，⿻社会必须建立在与⿻原则在形式和结构上都相匹配的基础设施之上。形式上，它们必须无缝地结合紧密相关的政治理念——权利体系，以及技术概念——操作系统。实质上，它们必须允许以⿻理解的方式对社会进行数字表示：作为多元化、交叉的社会群体和共同进行雄心勃勃和包容性合作的人们。
Rights are a ubiquitous feature underpinning democratic life. Most simply imagined, democracy (etymologically "rule of the people") is a system of government, of collective decision-making by the people, rather than a set of actions a government takes towards its people. Yet evolving from its ancient Athenian origins, shaped by Enlightenment philosophy and forged through revolution, democracy came to also enshrine a set of fundamental freedoms and rights. While these "rights" have varied across democracies in both time and space, broad patterns are not only identifiable but have formed the foundation of documents such as the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), including equality, life, liberty, personal security, speech, thought, conscience, property, association—to name a few. While there are important debates around the edges of these principles, in broad outlines they define and defend core aspects of the nearly universal characteristics of human behavior as highlighted by leading anthropologists like Nicholas Christakis.[^Blueprint] These include what Christakis calls the "social suite", the nearly universal tendency of humans to have a sense of personal identity, to form familial relationships as well as long-term friendships, for these to form the basis of broader cooperative social networks and groups towards which members are "biased", to have differentiated trust within these networks based on relationships and capacities and to learn from each other.
权利是支撑民主生活的一个普遍特征。最简单的设想是，民主（从词源上讲是“人民统治”）是一种政府制度，是人民集体决策的制度，而不是政府对其人民采取的一系列行动。然而，从其古代雅典起源发展而来，并受到启蒙思想的塑造以及革命的锻造，民主也开始包含一套基本自由和权利。虽然这些“权利”在不同民主国家的时间和空间上有所不同，但广泛的模式不仅是可以识别的，而且构成了诸如《联合国世界人权宣言》（UDHR）等文件的基石，其中包括平等、生命、自由、人身安全、言论、思想、良心、财产、结社——仅举几例。虽然围绕这些原则的边缘存在重要的争论，但在广泛的概要中，它们定义和捍卫了人类行为几乎普遍特征的核心方面，正如尼古拉斯·克里斯塔基斯等杰出的人类学家所强调的那样。[^Blueprint]其中包括克里斯塔基斯所说的“社会特征”，即人类几乎普遍存在的拥有个人认同感、形成家庭关系以及长期友谊的倾向，这些倾向构成了更广泛的合作社会网络和群体的基础，成员们对这些群体持有“偏见”，在这些网络中根据关系和能力对信任进行区分，并相互学习。
[^Blueprint]: Nicholas A. Christakis, Blueprint: The Evolutionary Origins of a Good Society (New York: Little Brown Spark, 2019).
[^Blueprint]: Nicholas A. Christakis, Blueprint: The Evolutionary Origins of a Good Society (New York: Little Brown Spark, 2019).
Regardless of the precise makeup and universality, however, what we are most interested in is why they are so integral to democracy as a system of government and why so many people and organizations believe a democracy cannot exist without protecting these rights. In her recent book, Justice by Means of Democracy, leading ⿻ political philosopher Danielle Allen provides a clear account of this connection: government cannot respond to the "will of the people" if their will cannot be safely and freely expressed.[^JbmD] If voting one's conscience is personally dangerous, there is no reason to believe that outcomes reflect anything other than a coercer’s will. If citizens cannot form social and political associations free of duress, they cannot coordinate to contest decisions by those in power. If they cannot seek livelihood through a diversity of economic interactions (for example, because they are enslaved either by the state or a private master), we should expect their expressed politics to obey their masters, not their inner voice. Without rights, elections become shams.
然而，不管其精确构成和普遍性如何，我们最感兴趣的是为什么它们对作为政府制度的民主如此重要，以及为什么这么多人和组织认为如果没有保护这些权利，民主就不可能存在。在最近出版的《通过民主实现正义》一书中，领先的⿻政治哲学家丹妮尔·艾伦对这种联系作出了清晰的解释：如果人民的意愿无法安全和自由地表达，政府就不能回应“人民的意愿”。[^JbmD]如果按照自己的良心投票会危及个人安全，那么没有理由相信结果反映的只是胁迫者的意愿。如果公民不能在不受胁迫的情况下形成社会和政治协会，他们就无法协调起来反对当权者的决定。如果他们不能通过多种经济互动谋生（例如，因为他们被国家或私人主人奴役），我们应该预期他们的政治表达会服从他们的主人，而不是他们的内心声音。没有权利，选举就会成为骗局。
[^JbmD]: Danielle Allen, Justice by Means of Democracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2023).
[^JbmD]: Danielle Allen, Justice by Means of Democracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2023).
Many prominent democracies have "committed suicide" through undermining the rights from which they were forged. Perhaps the most famous example was the Weimar Republic that governed Germany for most of the 30 years between the World Wars and ended in the election of the National Socialist German Workers (Nazi) party to a plurality of seats in the parliament, or Reichstag. This famously led to the appointment of Adolf Hitler as Chancellor.[^Evans] Yet, today many democratic societies have elected leaders and governments that have curtailed liberties in a manner that converts them from democracies to what political scientists Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way have labeled "competitive authoritarian" regimes.[^Levitsky] Concerns about unfree societies undermining democratic functioning are neither abstract nor theoretical, but current.
许多著名的民主国家通过破坏其赖以建立的权利而“自杀”。也许最著名的例子是魏玛共和国，它在两次世界大战之间的30多年的大部分时间里统治着德国，并最终导致国家社会主义德国工人党（纳粹党）在议会或帝国议会中获得多数席位。[^Evans]众所周知，这导致阿道夫·希特勒被任命为总理。然而，今天许多民主社会都选举出了限制自由的领导人和政府，这将它们从民主国家变成了政治学家史蒂文·莱维茨基和卢坎·A·韦伊所称的“竞争性威权”政权。[^Levitsky]关于不自由的社会破坏民主运作的担忧既不是抽象的也不是理论上的，而是当前的。
[^Evans]: Richard Evans, The Coming of the Third Reich (New York: Penguin, 2005). [^Levitsky]: Steven Levitsky, Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2012).
[^Evans]: Richard Evans, The Coming of the Third Reich (New York: Penguin, 2005). [^Levitsky]: Steven Levitsky, Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2012).
Almost all democracies share a focus, and expect others to share a focus, on the preservation of some strongly overlapping set of such rights of speech and association as basic preconditions for democratic functioning. For example, Scandinavian countries have emphasized the importance of what might be called "positive freedom of speech," namely that every citizen regardless of means has a viable path for their voice to be heard, whereas others such as the US, emphasize "negative freedom of speech," that no one may impede through government intervention the expression of a view. Some societies (e.g. in Europe) tend to emphasize the importance of privacy as a fundamental right necessary for civil society to exist independently of the state and thus for politics to be possible. Others (e.g. in Asia) tend to emphasize rights of assembly and association as more central to democratic function. Despite these variances, the underlying assumption of rights of speech and association is that they protect agency, so citizens may have the autonomy to form and advance associations for their common interests, so these common interests can be heard politically.
几乎所有民主国家都关注，并期望其他国家也关注，维护一些强烈重叠的言论和结社权利，作为民主运作的基本前提。例如，斯堪的纳维亚国家强调了所谓的“积极言论自由”的重要性，即每个公民无论其经济状况如何，都有可行的途径让他们的声音被听到，而其他国家，如美国，则强调“消极言论自由”，即任何人都不得通过政府干预来阻止观点的表达。一些社会（例如，在欧洲）倾向于强调隐私作为公民社会独立于国家存在并因此使政治成为可能的基本权利的重要性。其他社会（例如，在亚洲）倾向于强调集会和结社权利对民主运作更为重要。尽管存在这些差异，但言论和结社权利的基本假设是它们保护代理权，因此公民可以拥有自主权来形成和推进他们共同利益的协会，从而使这些共同利益可以在政治上得到表达。
National (and subnational) governments, especially judicial systems, often play a critical role in ensuring that rights are respected and adjudicating their boundaries. Yet thinking of rights only in terms of national legal systems is misleading. Rights represent deeply held beliefs and values rooted in a range of diverse cultural contexts (national, subnational, transnational, etc.). Rights not only carve the possibility space for human action, they confer legitimacy. For example, private workplaces or internet platforms generally may restrict speech. Yet expectations of rights of free speech put severe limits on the kinds of restrictions on speech employees and customers are willing to accept. Similarly, although documents like the UDHR are generally not legally binding, they still inspire and influence laws in many countries, including decisions made by the Supreme Court of Appeal in South Africa.[^SAintl] Institutions of different scales (courts, corporations, civil society groups, etc,) are crucial in ensuring these shared cultural expectations are upheld, and no one institution on their own is the "enforcer" or "source" of rights. Furthermore, many religious traditions hold that the source of rights is divine rather than earthly. In this sense, rights may be thought to exist across, above and beyond states, even if states are one critical defender of them.
国家（和次国家）政府，特别是司法系统，通常在确保尊重权利和裁定其界限方面发挥着关键作用。然而，仅仅从国家法律制度的角度来考虑权利是具有误导性的。权利代表着根植于一系列不同文化背景（国家、次国家、跨国等）中的深层信仰和价值观。权利不仅为人类行动创造了可能性空间，而且赋予了合法性。例如，私人工作场所或互联网平台通常可以限制言论。然而，对言论自由权利的期望对雇员和客户愿意接受的言论限制类型施加了严格的限制。同样，尽管像《世界人权宣言》这样的文件通常不具有法律约束力，但它们仍然激励和影响许多国家的法律，包括南非上诉法院做出的裁决。[^SAintl]不同规模的机构（法院、公司、民间团体等）对于确保这些共同的文化预期得到遵守至关重要，没有任何一个机构本身是权利的“执行者”或“来源”。此外，许多宗教传统认为权利的来源是神圣的而不是世俗的。从这个意义上说，权利可以被认为存在于国家之间、之上和之外，即使国家是捍卫权利的一个关键捍卫者。
[^SAintl]: Hurst Hannum, "The Status of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in National and International Law" Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law 25, no. 287 (1995-1996): 287-397.
[^SAintl]: Hurst Hannum, "The Status of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in National and International Law" Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law 25, no. 287 (1995-1996): 287-397.
Rights are also often aspirations and goals, rather than fixed and attainable realities. Much of the history of the US is a drama about the fulfillment of founding aspirations to equality that were long denied.[^Lepore] Many positive rights (e.g. a quality education, decent housing) are outside the capacity or mandate of governments, especially in developing countries, to immediately deliver but nonetheless are testaments to the deepest aspirations of a people.[^Greene]
权利往往也是愿望和目标，而不是固定和可实现的现实。美国历史上大部分时间都在上演一部关于实现建国时长期被否定的平等愿望的戏剧。[^Lepore]许多积极权利（例如优质教育、体面住房）超出了政府的能力或授权范围，尤其是在发展中国家，无法立即实现，但这仍然是人民最深切愿望的证明。[^Greene]
[^Lepore]: Jill Lepore, These Truths: A History of the United States (New York: Norton, 2018). [^Greene]: Jamal Greene, How Rights Went Wrong: How our Obsession with Rights is Tearing America Apart (Boston: Mariner, 2021).
[^Lepore]: 吉尔·莱波尔，《这些真理：美国史》(纽约：诺顿出版社，2018年)。[^Greene]:贾马尔·格林，《权利何以出错：我们对权利的痴迷如何撕裂美国》(波士顿：航海家出版社，2021年)。
Operating systems (OSs) are a ubiquitous feature underpinning digital life. Almost every digital interaction you have had depends on an underlying OS. Linux is the most ambitious and successful open-source software project of all time. Windows, produced by one of our employers, is another ubiquitous piece of software. iOS and Android power most smartphones.
操作系统(OS)是支撑数字生活的普遍特征。你几乎每一次数字互动都依赖于底层操作系统。Linux是有史以来最雄心勃勃、最成功的开源软件项目。由我们的一位雇主生产的Windows是另一款普遍存在的软件。iOS和Android为大多数智能手机提供动力。
OSs roughly define the possibility space for applications that run on them. There are basic traits in terms of performance, appearance, speed, machine memory usage—to name a few—that applications running on a particular OS share and must respect to work on that platform. For example, iOS and Android allow for touch interfaces, while earlier smartphones (like the Blackberry or Palm) relied on styluses or keyboard entry. Even today, iOS and Android apps have different looks, feels and performance characteristics. Applications are coded for one (or possibly multiple) of these platforms, drawing on the processes built into the OS to determine what their application can and cannot do, what it has to build bespoke and what it can rely on underlying processes for.
操作系统大致定义了在其上运行的应用程序的可能性空间。就性能、外观、速度、机器内存使用率等基本特征而言，在特定操作系统上运行的应用程序共享这些特征，并且必须遵守这些特征才能在该平台上工作。例如，iOS和Android允许触摸界面，而早期的智能手机（如黑莓或Palm）则依赖于触控笔或键盘输入。即使在今天，iOS和Android应用程序的外观、感觉和性能特征也各不相同。应用程序针对这些平台中的一个（或多个）进行编码，利用内置于操作系统中的流程来确定其应用程序可以做什么和不能做什么，它必须构建哪些定制功能以及它可以依靠哪些底层流程。
Boundaries are rarely sharp. While Macintosh was the first mass-market computer with a graphical user interface (GUI) OS
界限很少是清晰的。虽然Macintosh是第一台具有图形用户界面(GUI)操作系统的普及型计算机
Apple LISA II Macintosh-XL，最早的商用图形用户界面计算机之一。
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Figure 4-0-A. Apple LISA II Macintosh-XL, one of the first commercially available personal computers using a graphical user interface. Source: bGerhard «GeWalt» Walter, retrieved from [Wikipedia](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Apple-LISA-Macintosh-XL.jpg). CC0.
图4-0-A。Apple LISA II Macintosh-XL，最早使用图形用户界面的商用个人电脑之一。资料来源：bGerhard «GeWalt» Walter，摘自[维基百科](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Apple-LISA-Macintosh-XL.jpg)。CC0。
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Earlier computers with a command-line interface sometimes had programs that included elements like a GUI. Similarly, while virtual (VR) and augmented reality (AR) headsets (see our chapter on Immersive Shared Reality below) are much more effective today, there are some VR and AR experiences that can run on a smartphone, properly worn on the head. Furthermore, while OS designers try to include security protocols that defend against application behaviors that violate or threaten the integrity of the underlying OS, they can never hope to avoid them entirely.[^WorldEnds] Many, perhaps most, computer "viruses" are precise examples of such violations. OSs thus define the normal behavior of applications on their system, providing tools applications can harness and reasonable expectations they can have about other applications, defining the terrain of the easily possible.
早期的带命令行界面的计算机有时会有包含GUI元素的程序。同样，虽然虚拟现实(VR)和增强现实(AR)耳机（见我们下面关于沉浸式共享现实的章节）在今天效率更高，但也有一些VR和AR体验可以在智能手机上运行，正确佩戴在头上。此外，虽然操作系统设计人员试图包含防御违反或威胁底层操作系统完整性的应用程序行为的安全协议，但他们永远无法希望完全避免它们。[^WorldEnds]许多，也许大多数计算机“病毒”都是此类违规的精确示例。因此，操作系统定义了其系统上应用程序的正常行为，提供了应用程序可以利用的工具以及它们对其他应用程序的合理期望，定义了轻松实现的范围。
[^WorldEnds]: Nicole Perlroth, This is How They Tell Me the World Ends: the Cyberweapons Arms Race (New York: Bloomsbury, 2021).
[^WorldEnds]: 尼科尔·珀尔罗斯，《这就是他们告诉我世界末日的方式：网络武器军备竞赛》(纽约：布卢姆斯伯里出版社，2021年)。
OSs constantly must adapt to unanticipated behaviors by applications, both desired (so as to empower new applications) and undesired to defend against viruses. These adaptations may be minor and superficial; for example, we often receive updates to the OSs on smartphones to defend against security threats. Or, over time phones have transitioned away from users typing "emoticons" and "emojis" with character combinations to natively integrating them into the OS's typing features.[^Emoji] Other changes are more dramatic: for example, Google introducing Android versions compatible with cars and televisions.
操作系统必须不断适应应用程序的意外行为，既有期望的行为（为了增强新应用程序的功能），也有不希望的行为（为了防御病毒）。这些适应可能是微小和表面的；例如，我们经常收到智能手机操作系统的更新以防御安全威胁。或者，随着时间的推移，手机已经从用户键入“表情符号”和“表情符号”的字符组合过渡到将其本地集成到操作系统的打字功能中。[^Emoji]其他变化则更为剧烈：例如，谷歌推出了与汽车和电视兼容的Android版本。
[^Emoji]: Gretchen McCulloch, Because Internet: Understanding the New Rules of Language (New York: Riverhead Books, 2019).
[^Emoji]: 格雷琴·麦卡洛克，《因为互联网：理解新的语言规则》(纽约：河岸图书公司，2019年)。
OSs also defend their integrity in a variety of ways; while security patches are the sharpest and most adversarial, they coexist with developer education, the building of a broad ecosystem of developer support, the gradual development of customer usage and expectations, and more. Applications built on an OS not only support its internal development but also facilitate updates and even new OSs that can enhance or even rival the original OS. And while different OSs differ and compete, they share many common affordances. They at least partially attempt to allow cross-development and both backward and forward compatibility, so that applications designed for previous versions continue to work and that applications are "future proof" to new generations, thereby ensuring users access to a wide range of applications.
操作系统还通过多种方式捍卫其完整性；虽然安全补丁是最尖锐和最对抗性的，但它们与开发者教育、构建广泛的开发者支持生态系统、客户使用和期望的逐渐发展等等并存。构建在操作系统上的应用程序不仅支持其内部开发，还促进更新，甚至可以增强或超越原始操作系统的新的操作系统。虽然不同的操作系统有所不同并相互竞争，但它们共享许多共同的可供性。它们至少部分地试图允许交叉开发以及向后和向前兼容性，以便为早期版本设计的应用程序继续工作，并且应用程序对新一代具有“未来证明”性，从而确保用户可以访问广泛的应用程序。
OSs are almost always works-in-progress. They aim to support and foster functionality they are incompletely able to support. From these repeated attempts, they recursively learn to offer better support. For example, the first prominent audio "smart assistant" released (such as Apple's Siri and Amazon's Alexa) were often comically low quality; quality improved over time with user participation through the systems themselves, enabling more profound oral functions over time in these operating systems.
操作系统几乎总是在不断改进中。它们的目标是支持和促进它们无法完全支持的功能。通过这些反复尝试，它们递归地学习提供更好的支持。例如，第一个发布的突出的音频“智能助手”（例如苹果的Siri和亚马逊的Alexa）经常滑稽地质量低下；随着用户通过系统本身的参与，质量随着时间的推移而提高，从而使这些操作系统随着时间的推移能够实现更深奥的口语功能。
Systems of rights and OSs have many common traits: they serve as foundations for democratic societies and applications that run on top of them, have background conditions assumed in their processes, require special defense and protection to ensure the integrity of a system, and nonetheless, are often at least partly aspirational and incompletely fulfilled, at times in tension internally. And while they are often backed by powerful enforcement mechanisms, they are also part of a diffuse culture in addition to sharply defined institutions and code.[^CodeasLaw] Beyond these general parallels, however, there are two aspects of both rights and OSs that are particularly important and distinctive to a ⿻ perspective, which we will draw out and contrast to Libertarian and Technocratic approaches.
权利制度和操作系统具有许多共同特征：它们作为民主社会和在其之上运行的应用程序的基础，在其流程中假定背景条件，需要特殊防御和保护以确保系统的完整性，然而，它们往往至少部分是愿望性的，并且未能完全实现，有时在内部存在冲突。虽然它们通常得到强大的执行机制的支持，但它们也是弥漫文化的一部分，而不是明确定义的制度和代码。[^CodeasLaw]然而，除了这些普遍的相似之处之外，权利和操作系统还有两个方面对⿻视角特别重要和独特，我们将阐明这一点，并将其与自由主义和技术官僚方法进行对比。
[^CodeasLaw]: Lawrence Lessig, Code: And Other Laws of Cyberspace (New York: Basic Books, 1999).
[^CodeasLaw]:劳伦斯·莱西格，《代码：以及网络空间的其他法律》(纽约：基础图书，1999年)。
OSs are self-evidently dynamic, just as systems of rights, on reflection, are. This dynamism is central to ⿻. Rights support the democracies that rest on them and OSs support the applications that run on top of them. But the framers of rights and designers of OSs cannot anticipate (or cannot see except "through a glass darkly") how these foundations will be used, abused and reimagined, as different and sometimes adversarial actors harness (often through technological means) precisely the space they provide for such experimentation and innovation. The PRC’s Great Firewall, for example, restricts and censors internet content, codifying authoritarianism. Yet, global social media platforms endemic to democracies today have sometimes auctioned the attention of their customers including with micro-targeting for election interference and misinformation by adversaries.[^DiResta] Continued effective facilitation of democratic conversation will therefore require not just avoiding censorship, but also the sale of the attention economy to authoritarian influences, as highlighted by the recent international debate over potential authoritarian influences on the short-form video application, TikTok.[^EconomistTikTok]
操作系统显然是动态的，正如权利制度经过反思也是一样。这种活力对⿻至关重要。权利支持依赖它们的民主，操作系统支持在其之上运行的应用程序。但是，权利的制定者和操作系统的开发者无法预料（或只能“透过玻璃模糊地看到”）这些基础将如何被使用、滥用和重新构想，因为不同的、有时是对立的参与者（通常通过技术手段）利用他们为这种实验和创新提供的空间。例如，中国大陆的“防火墙”限制和审查互联网内容，将专制主义编纂成法。然而，当今民主社会中流行的全球社交媒体平台有时会拍卖其客户的注意力，包括通过微型定位来进行选举干预和对手的虚假信息。[^DiResta]因此，持续有效地促进民主对话不仅需要避免审查制度，还需要避免将注意力经济出售给专制势力，正如最近关于潜在专制势力对短视频应用TikTok的影响的国际辩论所强调的那样。[^EconomistTikTok]
[^DiResta]: Renee DiResta, Kris Shaffer, Becky Ruppel, David Sullivan, Robert Matney, Ryan Fox, Jonathan Albright and Ben Johnson, "The Tactics & Tropes of the Internet Research Agency" (2019), presented to the Congress of the United States, available at https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/senatedocs/2/. [^EconomistTikTok]: The Economist, "Tick, Tock: Will TikTok Still Exist in America?" March 13, 2024.
[^DiResta]:蕾妮·迪雷斯塔、克里斯·沙弗、贝基·鲁佩尔、大卫·沙利文、罗伯特·马特尼、瑞恩·福克斯、乔纳森·奥尔布赖特和本·约翰逊，“互联网研究机构的策略与比喻”（2019年），提交给美国国会，可在https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/senatedocs/2/获得。[^EconomistTikTok]:《经济学人》，“滴答，滴答：TikTok在美国还会存在吗？”2024年3月13日。
Thus, our understanding of free speech, once considered the primary expression of a right that ensures citizens can freely form and build support for political positions, is being challenged as a result of information technology. This assumption was founded on an environment where information was scarce and thus its suppression was one of the more effective ways to avoid voices being heard. The present environment is different: information is abundant and attention scarce. Thus it is often easier for adversaries who seek to suppress or censor inconvenient views (attacking the foundations of democracy) to simply flood the information commons with distractions and spam, rather than try to suppress dissidents and unwanted content (documented dramatically by the research of Gary King, Jennifer Pan and Molly Roberts).[^Roberts] Under such attacks, ensuring diverse, relevant and genuine content is surfaced for attention is the challenge, not (only) preventing literal censorship. We suspect our protections around free speech will need to evolve correspondingly and discuss pathways to ensure this happens below.
因此，我们对言论自由的理解，曾经被认为是确保公民可以自由地形成和建立对政治立场的支持的权利的主要表达，正在因为信息技术而受到挑战。这一假设是建立在一个信息匮乏的环境中的，因此压制信息是避免听到声音的更有效方法之一。目前的环境有所不同：信息丰富，注意力稀缺。因此，那些试图压制或审查令人不安的观点（攻击民主基础）的对手，往往更容易用干扰和垃圾邮件充斥信息公共领域，而不是试图压制异议和不需要的内容（加里·金、詹妮弗·潘和莫莉·罗伯茨的研究对此进行了生动的记录）。[^Roberts]在这种攻击下，确保为关注呈现多样化、相关和真实的内容才是挑战，而不是（仅仅）防止文字审查。我们怀疑我们围绕言论自由的保护将需要相应地发展，并在下面讨论确保此类事情发生的途径。
[^Roberts]: Gary King, Jennifer Pan and Margaret E. Roberts, "How the Chinese Government Fabricates Social Media Posts for Strategic Distraction, Not Engaged Argument", American Political Science Review 111, no. 3 (2017): 484-501.
[^Roberts]: 加里·金、詹妮弗·潘和玛格丽特·E·罗伯茨，“中国政府如何伪造社交媒体帖子以进行战略性转移注意力，而不是参与论证”，《美国政治科学评论》第111卷，第3期（2017年）：484-501。
Yet dynamism is not desirable for its own sake, nor should it be used in a ⿻ vision to subsume the entire structure in the pursuit of some total ultimate goal. Instead, dynamism is an emergent property of adaptive systems discovering their future while renewing and improving their ability to continue to adapt in the future, self-organizing to the "edge of chaos" where complexity thrives and grows. OSs and rights can and should evolve to support the applications and democracies that run on top of it, rather than collapsing to an external will—whether it be the narrow profit interest of a company or some national interest.
然而，活力本身并非令人向往，也不应该在⿻愿景中被用来为了实现某种最终目标而吞没整个结构。相反，活力是适应性系统在发现其未来的同时更新和改进其继续适应未来能力的一种涌现特性，它自组织到“混沌边缘”，在那里复杂性蓬勃发展和增长。操作系统和权利应该并且可以进化以支持在其之上运行的应用程序和民主，而不是屈服于外部意志——无论是公司的狭隘利润利益还是某些国家利益。
A ⿻ understanding of rights recognizes systems and groups as much as people. Freedom of association and religion protect associations and religions themselves, as much as those who compose them. Federalist systems, like the US Constitution, recognize the rights of states and localities, not simply individuals. Even commercial freedoms, while often conceived of in terms of individual choices and bilateral exchange, usually protect at least as vigorously the rights of corporate entities and their contractual arrangements, and rights to collective bargaining. Similarly, OSs protect the interactions between applications and users, as much as applications and users separately. Thus, while some elements of a system of rights or OSs may be thought of as protecting or servicing individual users, there is nothing inherently individualistic about them. Similarly, speech, as a form of communication, necessarily involves more than one party. Whether within OSs or in “the public square,” the viability of a communication network depends on the collective participation and consent of its many willing applications, users, and groups.
对权利的-⿻-理解认识到系统和群体与个人同等重要。结社自由和宗教自由不仅保护组成这些社群的个人，也保护社群和宗教本身。像美国宪法这样的联邦制度承认州和地方的权利，而不只是个人的权利。即使商业自由通常被认为是个体选择和双边交易，但它通常也同样有力地保护公司实体及其合同安排的权利，以及集体谈判的权利。类似地，操作系统保护应用程序和用户之间的交互，以及应用程序和用户本身。因此，虽然某些权利制度或操作系统的元素可能被认为是保护或服务个体用户的，但它们本身并非天生就具有个人主义色彩。同样，作为一种沟通形式的言论必然涉及不止一方。无论是在操作系统中还是在“公共领域”，沟通网络的可行性都取决于其众多乐意参与的应用程序、用户和群体的集体参与和同意。
Furthermore, the entities protecting and defending these freedoms are rarely simply nation-states and their associated institutions. Commercial law is a leading example. As scholars such as Anne-Marie Slaughter and Katharina Pistor have highlighted, international networks of legal rules, trade agreements and mutual respect for precedents are (for better or worse) central to important topics like intellectual property, antitrust and capital requirements for financial institutions.[^NetworkLaw] Each of these is governed by a different network of professionals, international institutions, and even lobbying groups. Thus, rights are not just held by a diversity of groups forming an interacting network; they are also defined by a similar intersecting network of cultures, institutions, and agents. Rights emerge from intersecting people and social circles defending and protecting their networks of social interactions.
此外，保护和捍卫这些自由的实体很少仅仅是民族国家及其相关机构。商业法就是一个主要例子。正如安妮-玛丽·斯劳特和卡塔琳娜·皮斯托等学者所强调的那样，国际法律规则网络、贸易协定和对先例的相互尊重（无论好坏）对于知识产权、反托拉斯法和金融机构的资本要求等重要议题至关重要。[^NetworkLaw] 每一个议题都由不同的专业人员网络、国际机构，甚至是游说团体来管理。因此，权利不仅由构成相互作用网络的不同群体持有；它们也由类似的相互交织的文化、制度和代理网络来定义。权利源于相互作用的人们和社会圈子，他们捍卫和保护其社会互动网络。
[^NetworkLaw]: Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004). Katharina Pistor, The Code of Capital: How the Law Creates Wealth and Inequality (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2019).
[^NetworkLaw]：安妮-玛丽·斯劳特，《新世界秩序》（新泽西州普林斯顿：普林斯顿大学出版社，2004年）。卡塔琳娜·皮斯托，《资本法典：法律如何创造财富和不平等》（新泽西州普林斯顿：普林斯顿大学出版社，2019年）。
The dynamic, networked, and adaptive foundations of ⿻ rights and OSs that respectively support democratic exploration and the evolution of application environments stand in stark contrast to the political and technical monistic perspectives embodied in the ideologies of Libertarianism and Technocracy. Libertarianism is grounded in a rigid and “immutable” set of well-defined historical rights, which primarily emphasize individual private property and the prevention of any "violence" that challenges these property relations. Under this view, rights are abstracted or detached from both other rights and any social or cultural context from which they emerged. Rights belong exclusively to atomic individuals, and technical systems ought to insulate these rights as thoroughly and completely from any change or social intrusion as possible. On the other hand, Technocracy is rooted in the notion of an "objective," "utility" or "social welfare" function that technical systems are designed to “align to” and maximize. Where Libertarians see rights as absolute, unambiguous, static, and universal, the Technocrats deem them as mere obstacles, or encumbrances, in the pursuit of a definable social good.
分别支持民主探索和应用环境演变的-⿻-权利和操作系统的动态、网络化和适应性基础，与自由主义和技术统治意识形态中体现的政治和技术一元论观点形成鲜明对比。自由主义的基础是一套严格且“不变”的明确界定的历史权利，这些权利主要强调个人的私有财产和防止任何挑战这些财产关系的“暴力”。在这种观点下，权利是从其他权利以及产生它们的任何社会或文化背景中抽象出来或脱离出来的。权利专属于原子化的个人，技术系统应该尽可能彻底地将这些权利与任何变化或社会干预隔离开来。另一方面，技术统治植根于技术系统旨在“与之协调”并最大化的“客观”、“效用”或“社会福利”功能的概念。自由主义者将权利视为绝对的、明确的、静态的和普遍的，而技术统治者则认为权利是追求可定义社会利益的障碍或累赘。
However skeptical one may be of a future immersed in digitally simulated worlds (sometimes called "metaverses"), few would deny that many people live large parts of their lives online these days. In that growing part of our lives, what we do, say, and trade is constrained by the possibilities offered by the technologies that network us together—and thus weave our social fabric. The protocols that connect us thus define our rights in the digital age, forming the OS on which societies run. Intellectually and philosophically, the ⿻ tradition we described in our chapter on Connected Society focuses on the need to move beyond the simplistic frameworks for property, identity and democracy on which liberal democracies have been built in favor of more sophisticated alternatives that match the richness of social life. Technologically, the early networking protocols that provided a governance framework for intercomputer communication attempted precisely to accomplish this, fusing together the parallel but distinct ideas of rights and OSs. Here, interpersonal networking OSs aimed to provide the fundamental capacities to participants needed to support a ⿻ conception of rights.
无论人们对沉浸在数字模拟世界（有时称为“元宇宙”）的未来持多大的怀疑态度，几乎没有人会否认许多人现在都在网上生活了很大一部分时间。在我们日益增长的生活中，我们的所作所为、言论和交易受到将我们连接在一起的技术（从而编织我们的社会结构）所提供的可能性所约束。因此，将我们连接起来的协议定义了我们数字时代的权利，构成了社会运行的操作系统。在智力和哲学上，我们在关于互联社会的章节中描述的-⿻-传统侧重于需要超越自由民主国家所建立的关于财产、身份和民主的简单框架，转而采用更复杂的替代方案，以匹配丰富多彩的社会生活。在技术上，提供计算机间通信治理框架的早期网络协议正是试图做到这一点，将权利和操作系统的并行但不同的思想融合在一起。在这里，人际网络操作系统旨在为参与者提供支持-⿻-权利概念所需的基本能力。
超图的示意图，节点由代表社区的斑点连接。每个斑点内部都是社区控制的资产，这些斑点的饱和度代表商业信任，指向图表中的箭头代表访问数字世界的点。
Figure 4-0-B. A hypergraph that visualizes people, groups, relationships, and digital assets
图 4-0-B。一个可视化人员、群体、关系和数字资产的超图
Because technological systems are instantiated in formal mathematical relationships, a simple way to see what this requires is to use the canonical mathematical model that directly corresponds to ⿻ description of society such as the "hypergraph" as pictured in the figure. A hypergraph, which extends the more common idea of a network or graph by allowing groups rather than just bilateral relationships, is a collection of "nodes" (viz. people, represented by the dots) and "edges" (viz. groups, represented by the blobs). The shade of each edge/group represents the strength of the relationship involved (viz. mathematically its "weight" and "direction"), while the digital assets (e.g. data, computation and digital storage) contained in the edges represent the collaborative substrate of these groups. Any such digital model is, of course, not literally the social world but an abstraction of it and for real humans to access it requires a range of digital tools, which we represent by the arrows entering into the diagram. These elements constitute jointly a menu of rights/OS properties which each of the next five chapters articulates one of more completely: identity/personhood, association, commercial trust, property/contract and access.
由于技术系统以形式化的数学关系来实现，因此了解这需要什么的一个简单方法是使用直接对应于-⿻-社会描述的规范数学模型，例如图中所示的“超图”。超图通过允许群体而不是仅仅是双边关系来扩展更常见的网络或图的概念，它是“节点”（即人，由点表示）和“边”（即群体，由斑点表示）的集合。每条边/群体的阴影代表所涉及关系的强度（即数学上的“权重”和“方向”），而边中包含的数字资产（例如数据、计算和数字存储）代表这些群体的协作基质。任何这样的数字模型当然不是字面意义上的社会世界，而是对它的抽象，而对于真实的人来说，访问它需要一系列数字工具，我们用进入图表的箭头来表示。这些元素共同构成权利/操作系统属性菜单，接下来的五章中的每一章都会更完整地阐述其中一个或多个属性：身份/人格、结社、商业信任、财产/契约和访问。
The project of constructing shared digital protocols to reflect these is in nascent stages, as we highlighted in our chapter The Lost Dao and as increasingly accepted by many leading civil actors.[^Ford] Most of the natural, fundamental affordances of networking are not available to most people even in wealthy countries as basic parts of the online experience. There is no widely adopted, non-proprietary protocol for identification[^IDprotocols] that protects rights to life and personhood online, no widely adopted non-proprietary protocols for the ways we communicate [^MIMI] [^MLS] [^DIDComm] and form groups online that allows free association, no widely adopted non-proprietary protocols for payments to support commerce on real-world assets and no protocols for the secure sharing of digital assets like computation, memory[^FFC] and data[^holoChain] that would allow rights of property and contract in the digital world. Many of these services are almost all controlled and often quasi-monopolized by nation-state governments or more often by private corporations. And even the basic conception of networks that lies behind most approaches to addressing these challenges is too limited, ignoring the central role of intersecting communities. If rights are to have any meaning in our digital world, this has to change.
正如我们在《迷失的道》一章中所强调的那样，并且越来越多的主要民间行为者所接受的那样，构建共享数字协议以反映这些协议的项目仍处于起步阶段。[^Ford] 即使在富裕国家，大多数网络的自然、基本功能对于大多数人来说也不是在线体验的基本组成部分。没有广泛采用的、非专有的身份识别协议[^IDprotocols]来保护在线的生命权和人格权，没有广泛采用的、非专有的协议来规范我们在线交流[^MIMI] [^MLS] [^DIDComm]和组建群体的协议来实现自由结社，没有广泛采用的、非专有的支付协议来支持现实世界资产的商业活动，也没有协议来安全共享数字资产（如计算、内存[^FFC]和数据[^holoChain]），这将允许数字世界的财产权和契约权。这些服务中的许多服务几乎全部由民族国家政府控制，更常见的是由私营公司控制，甚至经常形成准垄断。即使是大多数解决这些挑战的方法背后的网络基本概念也过于有限，忽略了相互交叉的社区的核心作用。如果权利要在我们的数字世界中具有任何意义，这一点必须改变。
[^Ford]: Jenny Toomey and Michelle Shevin, "Reconceiving the Missing Layers of the Internet for a More Just Future", Ford Foundation available at https://www.fordfoundation.org/work/learning/learning-reflections/reconceiving-the-missing-layers-of-the-internet-for-a-more-just-future/. Frank H. McCourt, Jr. with Michael J. Casey, Our Biggest Fight: Reclaiming Liberty, Humanity, and Dignity in the Digital Age (New York: Crown, 2024). McCourt has founded Project Liberty, one of the largest philanthropic efforts around reforming technology largely based on this thesis.
[^Ford]：珍妮·图米和米歇尔·谢文，“重新构想互联网的缺失层，以创造更美好的未来”，福特基金会，网址：https://www.fordfoundation.org/work/learning/learning-reflections/reconceiving-the-missing-layers-of-the-internet-for-a-more-just-future/。小弗兰克·H·麦考特与迈克尔·J·凯西，《我们最大的斗争：在数字时代重新夺回自由、人性与尊严》（纽约：皇冠出版社，2024年）。麦考特创立了自由项目，这是围绕着基于这一论点的技术改革而进行的最大慈善努力之一。
Luckily, it has begun to. A variety of developments in the past decade have fitfully taken up the mantle of the "missing layers" of the internet. This work includes the "web3" and "decentralized web" ecosystems, the Gaia-X data-sharing framework in Europe, the development of a variety of digital-native currencies and payment systems and most prominently growing investment in "digital public infrastructure" as exemplified by the "India stack" developed in the country in the last decade. These efforts have been underfunded, fragmented across countries and ideologies and in many cases limited in ambition or misled by Technocratic or Libertarian ideologies or overly simplistic understanding of networks. But they together represent a proof of concept that a more systematic pursuit of ⿻ is feasible. In this part of the book, we will show how to build on these projects, invest in their future and accelerate our way towards a ⿻ future.
幸运的是，它已经开始改变了。过去十年中出现的各种发展断断续续地承担起了互联网“缺失层”的任务。这项工作包括“web3”和“去中心化网络”生态系统、欧洲的Gaia-X数据共享框架、各种数字原生货币和支付系统的发展，以及最显著的是对“数字公共基础设施”日益增长的投资，例如过去十年在印度发展起来的“印度堆栈”。这些努力资金不足，跨国家和意识形态支离破碎，在许多情况下，野心有限，或者被技术统治或自由主义意识形态所误导，或者对网络的理解过于简单。但它们共同代表了一个概念证明，即更系统地追求-⿻-是可行的。在本书的这一部分，我们将展示如何在此基础上继续努力，投资其未来，并加快我们走向-⿻-未来的步伐。
[^IDprotocols]: Closed proprietary namespaces and globally managed registries (see “Decentralized Identifiers (DIDs) V1.0.” W3C, July 19, 2022, https://www.w3.org/TR/did-core/) as well as verifiable credentials that support collection of credentials from a variety of sources (see “Verifiable Credentials Data Model 1.0.” W3C, March 3, 2022. https://www.w3.org/TR/vc-data-model/.) [^MIMI]: “More Instant Messaging Interoperability (Mimi),” Datatracker, n.d. https://datatracker.ietf.org/group/mimi/about/. [^MLS]: “Messaging Layer Security,” Wikipedia, January 31, 2024, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Messaging_Layer_Security. [^DIDComm]: “DIDComm v2 Reaches Approved Spec Status!” Decentralized Identity Foundation, July 26, 2022, https://blog.identity.foundation/didcomm-v2/. [^FFC]: See Filecoin Foundation (https://fil.org/) and IPFS (https://www.ipfs.tech/) [^holoChain]: See Holochain (https://www.holochain.org/)
[^ID协议]: 封闭的专有命名空间和全局管理的注册表（参见“去中心化标识符 (DID) V1.0”。万维网联盟 (W3C)，2022年7月19日，https://www.w3.org/TR/did-core/），以及支持从各种来源收集凭据的可验证凭据（参见“可验证凭据数据模型 1.0”。万维网联盟 (W3C)，2022年3月3日，https://www.w3.org/TR/vc-data-model/）。[^MIMI]：“更即时的消息互操作性 (Mimi)”，数据追踪器，日期未标明，https://datatracker.ietf.org/group/mimi/about/。[^MLS]：“消息层安全性”，维基百科，2024年1月31日，https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Messaging_Layer_Security。[^DIDComm]：“DIDComm v2 达到了批准规范状态！”去中心化身份基金会，2022年7月26日，https://blog.identity.foundation/didcomm-v2/。[^FFC]:参见 Filecoin 基金会 (https://fil.org/) 和 IPFS (https://www.ipfs.tech/)。[^holoChain]:参见 Holochain (https://www.holochain.org/)。
